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CITIZENS ASSOCIATION OF GEORGETOWN v.
WASHINGTON: AWARDING ATTORNEYS' FEES IN
CITIZEN SUITS TO ENFORCE THE CLEAN AIR ACT
Traditionally American courts require that each litigant bear
his own attorneys' fees.' The "American rule," however, has not
been without its exceptions: fee shifting may be authorized by
statute 2 or under established equitable doctrines. 3 Brief judicial
recognition was accorded to an equitable exception allowing
award of fees to a "private attorney general."4 The Supreme
Court in Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 5 however,
abrogated further use of the private attorney general rationale
in the absence of statutory fee shifting authority.
6
Citizens Association of Georgetown v. Washington7 raises the
issue of fee shifting in the context of enforcing the Clean Air
Act." Ostensibly pursuant to the citizen suit provision of the
Clean Air Amendments of 1970,9 the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia awarded attorneys' fees to the
environmental interest groups who were the unsuccessful plain-
tiffs in the action. The fee award was made against officials of
the District of Columbia who were joined as defendants in the
suit on the allegation that they had failed their duty under the
Act to regulate polluters. The district court found that the suit
I F.D. Rich Co. v. Industrial Lumber Co., 417 U.S. 116, 126 (1974); Fleischmann
Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 717 (1967); Arcambel v. Wiseman,
3 U.S. (3 Dali.) 306 (1796).
2See notes 84-87 infra & accompanying text.
3 See notes 88-91 infra & accompanying text.
'See notes 105-06 infra & accompanying text. Judge Jerome Frank first coined the
phrase "private attorney general" in a 1943 case involving a private citizen's standing to
sue a public official for violation of a specific statutory duty. See Associated Indus., Inc.
v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694, 704 (2d Cir.), vacated as moot, 320 U.S. 707 (1943). The phrase
has now come to refer to a civic-minded person who brings suit to prevent or correct
official misconduct. See Dawson, Lawyers and Involuntary Clients in Public Interest
Litigation, 88 HARV. L. REV. 849, 888 (1975).
5 421 U.S. 240 (1975). See generally Comment, After Alyeska: Will Public Interest Litiga-
tion Survive?, 16 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 267 (1976); Note, Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v.
Wilderness Society: Demise of the "Private Attorney General", 6 ENVT'L LAW 243 (1975); 6
Cum. L. REV. 481 (1975).
6 See text accompanying notes 107-117 infra.
7 535 F.2d 1318 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (per curiam).
8 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857-571 (1964).
9 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857-58a (1970), amending 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857-571 (1964).
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was legitimate and beneficial to the public interest.' The District
of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals, however, held that al-
though the citizen suit provision confers jurisdiction over gov-
ernment entities qua polluters, it does not reach government
regulators qua se. Given the defect in jurisdiction over the Dis-
trict of Columbia defendants, the fee award against them was
reversed. The circuit court gave no consideration to the possibil-
ity that fee shifting might be justified under one of the tradi-
tional equitable exceptions that survive Alyeska.I
Because the Georgetown decision may discourage public in-
terest suits to enforce the Clean Air Act, this Comment will
analyze critically its holding regarding attorneys' fee awards. The
court's construction of the citizen suit provision as precluding
statutory fee shifting against government officials alleged to have
failed their duty under the Act to regulate polluters will be
shown to be unnecessarily narrow. A more liberal reading is
consistent with congressional intent. Further, this Comment will
show that equitable fee shifting is permissible in these factual
circumstances under the established "substantial common ben-
efit" exception to the American rule.
Before reaching these conclusions, it is necessary first to
explore in more detail the express authorization of fee shifting
in the citizen suit provision of the Clean Air Amendments, and
the relevant aspects of the court opinions in Georgetown.
I. THE CITIZEN SUIT UNDER THE CLEAN AIR AMENDMENTS
Since the passage of the Clean Air Act in 196312 the role of
the federal government in the control of air pollution has be-
come increasingly important.' 3 The Clean Air Amendments of
1970 not only granted the federal government 4 extensive stan-
10 Citizens Association of Georgetown v. Washington, 383 F. Supp. 136, 143
(D.D.C. 1974).
11 535 F.2d at 1320. Plaintiffs' counsel failed to make an argument for an equitable
exception.
12 The Clean Air Act was the first federal air pollution control legislation. A prior
act, the Air Pollution Control Act of 1955, ch. 360, 69 Stat. 322, had placed responsibil-
ity for air pollution exclusively in the hands of the individual states. On the federal
level, it merely provided for research and technical assistance to aid in such control.
"3 See Kramer, The 1970 Clean Air Amendments: Federalism In Action or Inaction?, 6
TEx. TECH U.L. REV. 47 (1974). See generally Schroeder, Pollution in Perspective: A Survey
of the Federal Effort and the Case Approach, 4 NAT. REsOURCES LAw. 381 (1971).
14 The implementation of this legislation was originally the responsibility of the De-
partment of Health, Education, and Welfare. After the establishment of the Environ-
mental Protection Agency, the functions vested in the Secretary of HEW were trans-
ferred to the Administrator of the EPA. Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1970, § 2(a)(3),
84 Stat. 2086 (1970).
1977]
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 125:1402
dards-setting,' 5 regulatory, and enforcement authority, 17 but
also added the citizen suit provision of section 304.18
Section 304 allows a private citizen to commence a civil ac-
tion in federal district court, without regard to the amount in
controversy or citizenship of the parties, against any person-
including the Government-for violation of an emission stan-
dard, limitation, or order.' 9 A private citizen may also bring suit
against the Administrator of the Environmental Protection
Agency for failure to carry out any non-discretionary act re-
quired of him.20 The citizen suit provision permits the court
to award the costs of litigation, including reasonable attorney
and expert witness fees, to any party where "such award is
appropriate. '' 2' By making every person a potential law enforc-
er, this provision ameliorates the problem of inadequate gov-
ernment enforcement due to insufficient manpower and
resources.
22
The citizen suit provision "is carefully restricted to actions
where violations of standards and regulations or a failure on the
part of officials to act are alleged. '23 Section 304 also does not
specifically allow a damage remedy; 24 this may mean that citizen
suits are limited in the federal courts to actions for injunctive
relief.25 Additionally, the provision imposes severe procedural
requirements concerning-the exhaustion of administrative rem-
5 E.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857c-4, 1857c-6, 1857c-7, 1857f-9 (1970).
"6 E.g., id. §§ 1857c-5, 1857c-9.
7 E.g., id. §§ 1857c-8, 1857f-10.
18Id. § 1857h-2.
1Id. § 1857h-2(a)(1).
2 Id. § 1857h-2(a)(2).
21 Id. § 1857h-2(a).
22 "Authorizing citizens to bring suits for violations of standards should motivate
governmental agencies charged with the responsibility to bring enforcement and
abatement proceedings." S. REP. No. 1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 36-37 (1970).
21 S. REP. No. 1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 36 (1970). Defining the limits of citizen
suit jurisdiction becomes significant because the scope of such jurisdiction in turn de-
fines the limits of statutory fee-shifting. See notes 47-60 infra & accompanying text.
24 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-2 (1970). Both Senator Muskie, who introduced the 1970
Amendments, and Senator Hart expressed on the floor of the Senate their intentions
that the Amendments not allow for damage suits. 116 CONG. REc. 33102 (1970) (re-
marks of Senator Muskie); id. 33104 (remarks of Senator Hart).
2' Note, The Clean Air Amendments of 1970: Better Automotive Ideas From Congress, 12
B.C. InD. & CoNt. L. REV. 571, 614 (1971); Note, Federal Pollution Control: Participation by
States and lndividuals Enhances The National Pollution Control Effort, 16 VILL. L. REV. 827,
841 (1971). The language of 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-2(e) (1970) can be interpreted as both
permitting and denying suits for damages in the federal courts. For a discussion of the
arguments pro and con, see Note, Enforcement of the Clean Air Amendments of 1970, 48
NOTRE DAME LAw. 921, 931-33 (1973).
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edies. 26 If a citizen suit does satisfy these restrictions, however,
section 304 authorizes discretionary fee shifting by the court.
Moreover, by authorizing the court to award attorneys' fees and
costs to either party this provision makes the citizen suit a viable
remedy for public interest litigants with valid enforcement
claims or injunctive relief while discouraging frivolous or ha-
rassing actions.
27
II. THE GEORGETOWN OPINIONS
Plaintiff citizen groups28 brought suit under section 304 of
the Glean Air Amendments to enjoin construction of two office
buildings. Joined as defendants were the private corporate
builders and the public officials responsible for the regulation of
pollution in the District of Columbia.29 The basic complaint was
that automobiles parking in the buildings' garages would gener-
ate significant air pollution. 311 Plaintiffs argued two alternative
theories of relief, but lost in the district court on the merits.
Plaintiffs first argued that the buildings were "stationary
sources" of pollution, and therefore, the District of Columbia's
air quality implementation plan3 1 required a review of potential
26 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-2(b)(1970) requires sixty days notice be given to the Adminis-
trator, the state control agency, and the alleged polluter prior to bringing a citizen suit.
The purpose of this notice requirement is to delay any citizen suit in order to give
appropriate officials time to act. S. REP. No. 1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 37 (1970); City
of Highland Park v. Train, 519 F.2d 681, 690-91 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S.
927 (1976). Consequently, failure to give such notice does not necessarily cause the suit
to be barred forever. Although an action commenced before giving notice will be dis-
missed, plaintiff may then give notice and file suit with the same allegations. If the
responsible officials file suit, the private action is barred (with certain exceptions), but
the complaining party may intervene if the suit is in federal court. 42 U.S.C. §
1857h-2(b)(1)(B) (1970). Metropolitan Washington Coalition for Clean Air v. District of
Columbia, 373 F. Supp. 1089, 1092 (D.D.C. 1974), rev'd on other grounds, 511 F.2d 809
(D.C. Cir. 1975).
2742 U.S.C. § 1857h-2(d) (1970). See S. REP. No. 1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 38
(1970).
28 The Citizens Association of Georgetown, founded in 1878, is organized to pre-
serve the historical and scenic values of Georgetown for many years. The Committee of
100 on the Federal City, founded in 1923, is generally committed to improving the
human environment of the nation's capital. 383 F. Supp. at 138.
29 The local government defendants were Walter E. Washington, the Commissioner
of the District of Columbia; Julian R. Dugas, the Director of the D.C. Department of
Economic Development; and William C. McKinney, the Acting Director of the D.C.
Department of Environmental Services. Id.
3 The lower court found that this alleged detriment to the health of the individual
plaintiffs, and the potential loss to the corporate defendants if the plaintiffs succeeded
in this suit were in excess of $10,000.00. Id.
"' District of Columbia Air Quality Control Regulations, § 8-2:720(a), [1976] ENVIR.
REP. (BNA) 341:0501.
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pollution impact and the issuance of air quality permits preced-
ing construction.3 2 The district court found that the corporate
defendants had not violated an emission standard or limitation.
33
Although EPA regulations promulgated subsequent to the com-
mencement of construction of the buildings extended the categ-
ory of stationary sources to embrace "indirect sources," including
parking facilities, these regulations were not given retroactive
effect.a4 Consequently, the district court held that the first
theory failed as a matter of law.3 5 Plaintiff's second theory of
relief was that by 1977 the increased automobile traffic as-
sociated with the projects would result in pollution levels in viola-
tion of the applicable ambient air regulations. 36 In view of the
formidable problems of proof, it was not surprising that plain-
tiffs failed as a matter of fact under this second theory.
3 7
Notwithstanding plaintiffs' defeat on the merits, the district
court made a pro rata assessment against the government de-
32 Id. 341:0509.
13 383 F. Supp. at 139. The court also held that this finding did not effect its
decision that the citizen suit provision vested jurisdiction in the court.
34 40 C.F.R. § 51.18(a) (1976). The District of Columbia Implementation Plan re-
quired by § 110 of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5 (1970), was approved by the
EPA and went into effect in 1972. Subsequent events determined, however, that this
plan was incomplete and had elemental shortcomings in the attainment and mainte-
nance of the required national ambient air quality standards. Consequently, the EPA
withdrew approval of the maintenance provisions of the D.C. plan. 38 Fed. Reg. 12,920
(1973). The legislative background of air pollution control in the District of Columbia
pertinent to this case is set out in detail in Citizens Ass'n of Georgetown v. Washington,
370 F. Supp. 1101, 1105-06 (D.D.C. 1974).
The District plan was exempt from the requirement of indirect source review pro-
cedures, 383 F. Supp. at 141, and the District did not institute such procedures on its
own volition prior to the withdrawal of EPA approval. In the absence of a valid local
plan, the Administrator was required by § 110 of the Clean Air Act to promulgate the
regulations implementing these indirect source review procedures. 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5
(c)(1)(C) (1970). Pursuant to an order by the District of Columbia Circuit in National
Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 475 F.2d 968, 971 (D.C. Cir. 1973), as modified,
November 8, 1973, the Administrator established a procedure for reviewing some indi-
rect sources in the District. See 40 C.F.R. § 52.493 (1976). These regulations apply to
the construction or modification of certain parking facilities in the District. Id.
§ 52.493(c). The Administrator, motivated by equitable considerations, decided that
these review procedures would not apply to any project where construction had com-
menced prior to the actual promulgation of these rules. Thus, these regulations only
apply to parking facilities with more than 250 spaces whose construction or modifica-
tion had commenced after November 12, 1973. 38 Fed. Reg. 31,536 (1973). Conse-
quently, these regulations were inapplicable to the corporate defendants' projects be-
cause the corporate defendants began construction prior to November 13, 1973. 383 F.
Supp. at 141.
35 383 F. Supp. at 141.
36 1d. at 138-139.
" "Plaintiffs' evidence about the air quality in the Georgetown area in 1977 is
speculative, conflicting and inadequate to support a judgment." Id. at 142.
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fendants for one-third of plaintiffs' attorneys' fees.38 The justifi-
cation for the award was that" 'various actions and failures to act
[by the government officials] have been the principal cause of
the present litigation.' -39 The court found authority to make the
award in section 304 of the Clean Air Act4 and noted that this
authority was unaffected by plaintiffs' failure on the merits.
4'
The appropriateness standard conditioning fee awards under
section 304 was met because the suit had benefitted the public
interest as defined in the Clean Air Act.42 In particular, the
litigation prompted action "in the face of a clean air regulatory
vacuum in the District."43"In the district court's view the congres-
sional mandate to the District of Columbia to meet the Clean Air
Act's 1977 deadline for compliance with national air quality
standards imposed upon the District officials a "continuing obliga-
tion to act."' 44 The court concluded that the suit had benefitted
the public interest under the Act by educating the public regard-
ing the District's laxity in fulfilling this obligation.
45
The District of Columbia Circuit heard the case on appeal
3"Id. at 145. Plaintiffs did not seek costs or attorneys' fees from the corporate
defendants because the district court determined that they had not violated the law.
Although such a determination did not necessarily preclude an assessment of attorneys'
fees against these defendants, the plaintiffs chose to make no claim against them. Brief
for Appellees at 28. Additionally, "because a large portion of the attorneys' work in this
litigation related to the [corporate] defendants, plaintiffs requested that the district
court assess the District of Columbia for only its proportionate share of plaintiffs' costs,
including attorneys' fees." 383 F. Supp. at 144.
39 535 F.2d at 1320 (quoting Brief for Appellees at 24).
40 383 F. Supp. at 143-44.
41 "The plain meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-2(d) is that success or failure on the
merits has nothing to do with the trial court's power to award . . . attorneys' fees in
citizen suits under the Clean Air Act." 383 F. Supp. at 144. The legislative history bears
out this interpretation: "The court may award costs of litigation to either party
whenever the court determines that such an award is in the public interest without
regard to the outcome of the litigation." S. REP. No. 1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. at 65.
42 383 F. Supp. at 144-46.
4 3 1d. at 145.
44 Id.
45 Id. The court explained further:
In order to understand the public benefit conferred by this suit, it is necessary
to understand the basic design of the Clean Air Act. The structure of the Act
evidences the Congressional intent to rely on state and local governments for im-
plementation of control programs necessary to abate air pollution. 42 U.S.C.
§ 1857c-5. Where this reliance is frustrated by inaction, as is the case with the
District government, the locality is in imminent danger of one, and perhaps
both, of two unpleasant eventualities: 1) failure to attain air quality standards
requisite for good health, or 2) assumption by the federal government of
the task of effecting local air pollution control programs. See 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1857c-4(b), 1857c-5(c). In the latter case, the air quality control program
may not be responsive to particular, local needs.
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after the Supreme Court had rendered its decision in Alyeska.4"
In light of Alyeska's contraction of judicial power to shift attor-
neys' fees, the circuit court carefully scrutinized the source of
authority for the district court award-section 304. Section
304(d) authorizes fee shifting "in any action brought pursuant to
[section 304(a)] ... to any party, whenever the court determines
such award is appropriate. '4 7 The crucial prerequisite to author-
ity to shift fees under section 304(d), therefore, is that the under-
lying action be "pursuant to" section 304(a). Section 304(a) pro-
vides in relevant part that "any person may commence a civil
action on his own behalf ... against any person (including ...
any... governmental instrumentality ... to the extent permitted
by the Eleventh Amendment ... ) who is alleged to be in viola-
tion of... an emission standard or limitation. 48 The circuit court
construed the foregoing language of section 304(a) in light of its
legislative history as reaching a governmental instrumentality
only qua polluter and not qua regulator.49 In making this con-
struction the court gave weight to a drafting change in the sec-
tion prior to its enactment:
Although early versions of the legislation gave the dis-
trict courts jurisdiction over civil actions "for ...en-
forcement, or to require such enforcement," whenever a
government instrumentality was alleged to be in viola-
tion of "any . . . provision" of the Act, . . .the enacted
version . . . confers federal jurisdiction only over suits
against polluters, and under certain conditions, the Ad-
ministrator of the EPA."
Thus the court concluded that "an allegation that a government
instrumentality has failed to enforce the Clean Air Act does not
4 The Alyeska opinion was handed down on May 12, 1975. Although this was after
the briefs were submitted in the instant case, it was prior to the oral argument made on
October 16, 1975.
47 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-2(d)(1970).
48 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-2(a)(1970).
19 535 F.2d at 1320-21. The court noted that the complaint did not allege that any
District of Columbia facility was emitting pollutants into the air; rather, it only alleged
that the District failed to require preconstruction review of private buildings with large
parking garages. After specifying the relevant components of the statutory definition of
"emission standard or limitation", the court employed the appropriate definitions of
these separate components to demonstrate that the complaint could not be read to
allege that the District was in violation of an "emission standard or limitation." Id. at
1321-22.
50 535 F.2d at 1320-21 (footnote omitted). The court qualified this statement by
saying that it did not mean to imply that it was the intent of Congress in the earlier
versions to authorize district court jurisdiction over actions such as this one. Id. at 1321
n.3.
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satisfy the statutory requirement that the government instru-
mentality be alleged to be in violation of 'an emission standard or
limitation.' "5'
Under the two theories of relief 52 the lower court had as-
serted jurisdiction over the public defendants alternatively under
section 304(a) or under federal question jurisdiction.5 3 The gist
of the complaint against the District of Columbia under either
theory, however, was that it had failed its obligation under the
Act to regulate polluters. District officials in their capacities as
regulators had not instituted "preconstruction review" of private
buildings with large parking facilities. 54 No allegation that the
District itself was polluting in violation of the Act was made.
55
Having construed section 304(a) as reaching only polluters, the
circuit court held that jurisdiction over the District officials was
improperly extended.
5 6
In the absence of section 304(a) jurisdiction over the defen-
dants, the circuit court felt constrained to reverse the award of
attorneys' fees. 57 The federal question jurisdiction, although
valid, could not support the award because the jurisdictional
statute lacked an express authorization as required by Alyeska.
58
III. LESS RESTRICTIVE JUDICIAL APPROACHES
A. Unfortunate Ramifications of the Georgetown Decision
The Georgetown decision will undoubtedly have a discourag-
ing impact on public interest suits under section 304 to enforce
the Clean Air Act. Damage relief may well be unavailable in
section 304 suits; 59 therefore, the fee shifting provision in sec-
tion 304(d) is a crucial encouragement to citizen suits for in-
junctive relief. Absent fee awards the prospect of bearing the
51 Id. at 1320.
52 See notes 31-37 supra & accompanying text.
53 See 383 F. Supp. at 138-39. Regarding federal question jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331(a) (1970), the court concluded:
A substantial federal question exists as to whether the Clean Air Act in its
entirety requires that the Maloney and Inland Developments be reviewed by a
federal district court, prior to or during construction, to determine if construc-
tion will interfere with the attainment and maintenance of the national ambient
air quality standards in the District by May 31, 1977.
Id. at 139.
11 535 F.2d at 1320. For a discussion of the possible obstacle to citizen suits against




5 7 Id. at 1323.
51ld. at 1320.
"See notes 24-25 supra & accompanying text.
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entire litigation expenses will deter private enforcers from bring-
ing suits to curtail pollution. Georgetown removes this encour-
agement to citizen suits against private polluters in circumstances
under which it is arguably most necessary-cases in which the
local regulators themselves are not fulfilling their obligation
under the Act to regulate polluters.
6"
The circuit court remarked that "our conclusion does not
leave the public without a remedy when a state fails to meet its
responsibilities under the Clean Air Act."'61 The court, however,
neglected to evaluate the effectiveness of these alternative mea-
sures. For example, the court noted that the Administrator of
the EPA has the authority to implement corrective measures if a
state fails to submit or enforce an adequate implementation
plan. 62 Relying on the Administrator to promulgate regulations,
however, has significant drawbacks. Intervention by the Ad-
ministrator could result in the implementation of a program that
is unresponsive to local needs63 or incomplete because of equi-
table considerations arising from the delay in its promulgation.
64
Consequently, the locality may be unable to attain the proper air
quality standards within a reasonable time period. The circuit
court also suggested that a private citizen could seek relief in a
federal or state court based on a jurisdictional grant other than
the citizen suit provision. The court, however, did not suggest an
alternative source of jurisdiction that allowed for fee shift-
ing 65-an important incentive to environmental interest litiga-
' Even though the plaintiffs lost on the merits, theoretically attorneys fees could
have been taxed nevertheless to the private corporate defendants. See note 41 supra &
accompanying text. As jurisdiction over the corporate defendants was properly pur-
suant to § 304(a), such an award would not be precluded by the circuit court's narrow
construction of § 304(d). The problem is that such an award probably would not have
been appropriate as required by § 304(d), because the plaintiffs alleged that the District
was principally responsible for the litigation. See text accompanying note 39 supra. Thus
in future cases that are factually similar, even should plaintiffs succeed on the merits
(regarding "success" in this context, see notes 119-23 infra & accompanying text), the
possibility remains, depending upon the extent of the culpability of the local regulators,
that no award or only a partial taxing of attorneys fees against the private defendants
will be appropriate. Georgetown would bar these future plaintiffs from recovering fees
from the negligent public regulator, the appropriate party to tax. The local regulator is
the appropriate party to tax because taxing local government funds fairly distributes
the cost of the suit to its true beneficiaries--the members of the local public. For a
similar analysis under the substantial common benefit rationale, see notes 132-38 infra
& accompanying text.
61 535 F.2d at 1323.
62 Id.
63 See note 45 supra.
64 See note 34 supra.
65 535 F.2d at 1323. The only alternative that the court suggested was 28 U.S.C.
1410
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tion that seeks injunctive relief.
Another alternative course of action for plaintiffs in
Georgetown was direct judicial review of the implementation plan
by the court of appeals pursuant to Section 307(b)(1) of the
Clean Air Act.66 The plaintiffs could have then specifically chal-
lenged the provision exempting the corporate defendants' build-
ing projects.6 7 The court of appeals, however, would be required
to affirm the Administrator's decision unless the conclusions
reached were "arbitrary or capricious. 68 Given the complexity
of competing interests in establishing implementation plans, it is
highly doubtful that a court could make such a finding in the
face of the Administrator's expertise.6 9 Additionally, this review
would not involve the District of Columbia government and the
public would not be informed about the District's alleged negli-
gence in pollution regulation. Moreover, in the view of many
courts section 307 does not authorize fee shifting; 70 plaintiffs are
then forced to pay their own attorneys' fees regardless of the
outcome of the proceedings. In sum, this procedure is an inade-
quate substitute for litigation brought pursuant to the citizen suit
provision.
Contrary to the view of the circuit court, the Georgetoum
holding barring fee shifting on its facts leaves future plaintiffs
with only ineffective alternative remedies. Because of the crucial
role fee awards play in encouraging citizen suits to enforce the
Act, avoiding the Georgetown result in future cases presenting
similar factual circumstances is highly desirable.
§ 1331 (1970) (federal question jurisdiction). As the court previously noted, however,
this provision "will not support a claim for attorneys' fees." Id. at 1320; see text accom-
panying note 58 supra.
66 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-5(b)(1) (1970).
6 See note 34 supra. The exemption provision is an integral part of the regulation
reviewable only in the court of appeals. City of Highland Park v. Train, 519 F.2d 681,
688-89 (7th Cir. 1975)(citing cases).
68 E.g., South Terminal Corp. v. EPA, 504 F.2d 646 (Ist Cir. 1974); Friends of the
Earth v. EPA, 499 F.2d 1118 (2d Cir. 1974); Texas v. EPA, 499 F.2d 289 (5th Cir.
1974).69 See, e.g., Citizens Ass'n of Georgetown v. Washington, 370 F. Supp. 1101, 1108-09
(D.D.C. 1974).
70 Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 512 F.2d 1351 (D.C. Cir. 1975);
cf. Shannon v. United States Dep't of Housing and Urban Dev., 409 F. Supp. 1189
(E.D. Pa. 1976) (plaintiff suing under section 808 of Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1968 could not be awarded attorneys' fees pursuant to section 812(c) of the Act
because section 812 only applies, by its own terms, to suits commenced for violations of
sections 804-06). But see Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 484 F.2d 1331
(1st Cir. 1973); but cf. Sosa v. Fite, 498 F.2d 114, 121-22 (5th Cir. 1974) (plaintiff suing
under section 1635 of the Truth in Lending Act could be awarded attorneys' fees al-
though fee shifting was only authorized in suits brought pursuant to section 1640).
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B. Liberal Interpretation of the Citizen Suit Provision
An award of attorneys' fees to plaintiffs in Georgetown could
have been justified under a liberal interpretation of section
304(d), which authorizes fee shifting "to any party" in an action
brought "pursuant to [section 304(a)]." The circuit court im-
pliedly restricted "any party" to mean "any party over whom sec-
tion 304(a) jurisdiction is properly asserted." The liberal inter-
pretation would construe "any party" to include in certain cir-
cumstances parties properly joined to a section 304(a) action
although under a separate source of jurisdiction. For example,
because section 304(a) jurisdiction was properly asserted over the
corporate defendants in Georgetown, the action was in this sense
"pursuant to" section 304(a); because the District officials were
properly joined under federal question jurisdiction, authority
exists for an award of attorneys' fees. This broad construction of
section 304(d) is not foreclosed by the Supreme Court decision
in Alyeska and, furthermore, it is consistent with congressional
intent as evidenced in the legislative history of section 304.
The concern of the Supreme Court in Alyeska was to elimi-
nate judicial awards of attorneys' fees under a private attorney
general theory absent an express congressional authorization.
7'
Congress, however, has explicitly recognized the important pub-
lic interests involved in section 304 citizen suits. Were a court to
adopt the proposed liberal construction of section 304(d), it
would not be deciding which congressional policies are im-
portant enough to warrant fee shifting-the judicial practice
condemned by Alyeska; rather, it would be exercising an unques-
tioned judicial prerogative to determine the scope of the statu-
tory fee awards authorization.
In reversing the lower court award of fees, the circuit court
looked to the legislative history of section 304(a). This legislative
history-for example the drafting change undergone by the
section 72-supports the court's conclusion that only polluters are
subject to section 304(a) jurisdiction. 73 The proposed construc-
tion of section 304(d), however, does not involve any expansion
of federal jurisdiction under section 304(a); 4 rather, it merely
7' See text accompanying note 116 infra.
72 See text accompanying notes 49-50 supra.
13 The Administrator of the EPA, however, is subject to § 304(a) jurisdiction where
it is alleged that he has failed to perform a non-discretionary duty. 42 U.S.C. §
1857h-2(a)(2) (1970). This single express exception extending § 304(a) jurisdiction over
a regulator who has failed his duty to regulate renders all the more persuasive the
court's conclusion that § 304(a) does not reach other neglectful regulators.
74 The legislative history implies that in its explicit drafting of § 304(a) Congress
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authorizes fee shifting against a party who, although not subject
to section 304(a) jurisdiction, is nonetheless properly joined to
the action under an independent jurisdictional grant. The legis-
lative history is silent as to whether the scope of section 304(a)
jurisdiction strictly limits the parties against whom fees may be
assessed.75 It does indicate, however, that fee awards may be
made to losing parties, and this suggests, if anything, that it was
intended to give courts broad discretion in applying section
304(d).
One problem in applying the proposed construction of sec-
tion 304(d) is avoiding an assessment against a defendant joined
to a section 304 citizen suit purely for that purpose. This prob-
lem can be remedied if, as a prerequisite to assessing a party
joined under a jurisdictional grant other than section 304(a), the
courts require that such party be "inextricably involved" with the
subject matter of the suit properly brought pursuant to section
304(a). For example, the inextricably involved requirement was
satisfied in Georgetown. Although plaintiffs failed to meet their
burden of proof, the district court held that the suit against the
corporate defendants was non-frivolous. 76 Section 304(a) juris-
diction over the corporate defendants was never challenged; 77
plaintiffs' suit, therefore, was properly brought pursuant to sec-
tion 304(a). The central allegation of plaintiffs' complaint, how-
ever, charged the District officials, who were joined under fed-
eral question jurisdiction, with primary responsibility for forcing
a resort to judicial remedy by failing to fulfill their duty under
the Clean Air Act. Again, the undisturbed district court findings
supported the substantiality of the nonfeasance allegation. 78 The
public defendants were, therefore, inextricably involved in the
subject matter of plaintiffs' suit brought pursuant to section
intended to place well-defined limits on that section's expansion of federal jurisdiction.
See S. REP. No. 1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 36-39 (1970). The circuit court noted: "Con-
gress did not fling the courts' door wide open .... 535 F.2d at 1321 (quoting Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Train, 510 F.2d 692, 700 (1975)).
7T See S. REP. No. 1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 36-39, 65; H.R. REP. No. 1783, 91st
Cong., 2d Sess. 55-56, reprinted in [1970] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5374, 5388.
One senator has remarked that the question of attorneys' fees often fails to even come
up in legislative debate because the major concern is focused on other issues in the
legislation. See Tunney, Foreward: Financing the Costs of Enforcing Legal Rights, 122 U. PA.
L. REv. 632, 633-34 (1974). For a compilation of the legislative history of the amend-
ments to the Act generally, see ENVIROMENTAL POLICY DIVISION OF THE CONGRESSIONAL
RESEARCH SERVICE, A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE CLEAN AIR AMENDMENTS OF 1970
(1974).
76383 F. Supp. at 145.
See note 33 supra.
See notes 42-45 supra & accompanying text.
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304(a), and thus were appropriate parties for assessment of fees.
In this manner the inextricably involved test can operate to de-
fine the outer limits of appropriate fee shifting under section
304(d).
79
Because the liberal construction of section 304(d) is consis-
tent with Alyeska and the legislative history of section 304, and in
light of the unfortunate ramifications of the strict approach
taken by the Georgetown court, the liberal interpretation should
be adopted by the courts when presented with factually similar
cases. 
80
C. Equitable Exceptions to the American Rule
1. The History of Fee Awards
Except for the minimal amounts that may be taxed as costs
in the nature of "docket fees,"' 81 attorneys' fees are as a general
rule not taxable against losing parties in suits brought in federal
court.82 The American rule, however, has never acted as a com-
19 Even if the inextricably involved test is met, the issue will nonetheless remain
whether taxing the defendants joined under separate jurisdictional grants to the section
304 citizen suit is appropriate. This issue of appropriateness, however, must also be
explored even in the case of section 304(a) parties.
"' Precedent exists for broadly applying § 304(d) to parties not within § 304(a)
jurisdiction. See Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 484 F.2d 1331 (1st
Cir. 1973). In that case plaintiffs sued the Administrator of the EPA in the First Circuit
Court of Appeals under § 307, 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-5 (1970), using jurisdiction in a
"petition for review of the Administrator's action in approving or promulgating any
implementation plan." Id. (b)(1). Because of the close connection in subject matter be-
tween § 307 suits and § 304(a)(2) suits against the Administrator for failure to perform
nondiscretionary duty, 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-2(a)(2) (1970)-as evidenced in the legislative
history of the two sections-the First Circuit held the § 307 action to be pursuant to §
304(a) and so justified a § 304(d) award of fees. 484 F.2d at 1335-38. For authority
rejecting fees awards in § 307 actions, see Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v.
EPA, 512 F.2d 1351 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
81 28 U.S.C. §§ 1920, 1923(a) (1970). For the history of these docket fees provisions
and their relationship to the American rule, see Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilder-
ness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 247-60 (1975).
2 See note 9 supra. Among the justifications most often given for the American rule
are the following: (1) it encourages resolution of controversies through the courts by
removing the threat of paying an adversary's counsel fees; (2) it avoids the time, ex-
pense, and difficulty of proof inherent in determining reasonable attorneys' fees; (3) it
avoids penalizing one who chooses to prosecute or defend a lawsuit; (4) the contrary
rule floods courts with litigation. See Fleischman Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co.,
386 U.S. 714, 718 (1967); See also 6 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 54.70[2], at 1304
(2d ed. 1975).
A number of attacks on the American rule have been made. See. e.g., King & Pla-
ter, The Right to Counsel Fees in Public Interest Environmental Litigation, 41 TENN. L. REv.
27 (1973); Kuenzel, The Attorney's Fee: Why Not a Cost of Litigation?, 49 IOWA L. REV. 75
(1963); McLaughlin, The Recovery of Attorney's Fees: A New Method of Financing Legal
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plete bar against awarding attorneys' fees to the prevailing party;
the rule has been subject to a number of exceptions, both statut-
ory and equitable.8" The statutory provisions may: (1) provide
mandatory84 or discretionary8 5 awards to the successful plaintiff;
(2) permit discretionary awards to the prevailing party; 86 or (3)
permit awards "to any party, whenever the court determines
such award is appropriate. '87 Under the equitable exceptions,
federal courts employ their historical equity powers to award
fees when "the interests of justice so require.8 8 The equitable
exceptions include: (1) obdurate behavior, (2) common fund,
and (3) substantial common benefit.
The obdurate behavior theory allows courts to award coun-
sel fees to a litigant whose opponent has pursued a clearly un-
founded action or defense and has done so "in bad faith, vexati-
Services, 40 FORDHAM L. REv. 761 (1972); Stoebuck, Counsel Fees Included in Costs: A
Logical Development, 38 U. COLO. L. REv. 202 (1966); Comment, Court Awarded Attorney's
Fees and Equal Access to the Courts, 122 U. PA. L. REv. 636, 648-55 (1974); Note, Attorney's
Fees: Where Shall the Ultimate Burden Lie?, 20 VAND. L. REv. 1216 (1967).
13 Fees may also be shifted where parties to a contract have made specific provision
therefor. Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 717 (1967);
McCormick, Counsel Fees and Other Expenses of Litigation as an Element of Damages, 15
MINN. L. REv. 619, 636-37 (1931); see generally 2 S. SPEISER, ATTORNEYS' FEES 283-367
(1973). Some states have codified this common law exception with the added qualifica-
tion that such contracts be enforced reciprocally. E.g., CAL Civ. ConE § 1717 (West
1973).
" See, e.g., Packers and Stockyards Act of 1921, § 309(f), 7 U.S.C. § 210(f) (1970);
Perishable Agriculture Commodities Act of 1930, § 7(b), 7 U.S.C. § 499g(b) (1970);
Bankruptcy Act of 1898, § 64, 11 U.S.C. § 104(a)(1) (1970); Clayton Act § 4, 15 U.S.C.
§ 15 (1970); Federal Trade Commission Act § 801, 15 U.S.C. § 72 (1970); Truth in
Lending Act § 130(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(3) (Supp. II 1974); Consumer Product
Safety Act § 24, 15 U.S.C. § 2073 (1970); Organized Crime Control Act of 1970,
§ 901(a), 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1970); Fair Labor Standards Act § 16(b), 29 U.S.C. §
216(b) (1970); Railway Labor Act, § 3(p), 45 U.S.C. § 153 (p) (1970); Shipping Act of
1916; § 30, 46 U.S.C. § 829 (1970); Ship Mortgage Act of 1920, § 30(c), 46 U.S.C. §
941(c) (1970); Merchant Marine Act of 1936, § 810, 46 U.S.C. § 1227 (1970); Com-
munications Act of 1934, § 206, 47 U.S.C. § 206 (1970); Interstate Commerce Act of
1887, 55 8, 15(9), 16(2), 308(b), 49 U.S.C. §§ 8, 15(9), 16(2), 908(b) (1970).
"See, e.g., Education Act Amendments of 1972, § 718, 20 U.S.C. § 1617 (Supp. IV
1974); Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, §§ 201(c), 510(b), 29
U.S.C. §§ 431(c), 501(b) (1970); Fair Housing Act of 1968, § 812(c), 42 U.S.C. § 3 612(c)
(1970).
86 See, e.g., Securities Act of 1933, § 11(e), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e) (1970); Securiues Ex-
change Act of 1934, §§ 9(e), 18(a), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78i(e), 78r(a) (1970); Patent Act, 35
U.S.C. § 285 (1970).
17 Clean Air Amendments of 1970, § 304(d), 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-2(d) (1970); Fed-
eral Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, § 505(d), 33 U.S.C. § 1365(d)
(Supp. III 1973); Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act of 1972,
§ 105(g)(4), 33 U.S.C. § 1415(g)(4) (Supp. III 1973).
88 Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 5 (1973). For a historical development of American
equity courts' power to grant fees and costs, see Guardian Trust Co. v. Kansas City S.
Ry. Co., 28 F.2d 233, 240-46 (8th Cir. 1928),rev'd. on other grounds, 281 U.S. 1 (1930).
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ously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons. '89 In recent years, the
bad faith exception has been expanded to justify an award of
attorneys' fees in cases where plaintiffs have been forced to seek
judicial assistance in order to enjoy a clearly defined and estab-
lished right."
The common fund doctrine permits a plaintiff to recover
attorneys' fees when his action results in the establishment or
preservation of a fund in which others have the right to share.
In order to prevent unjust enrichment, each beneficiary is indi-
rectly charged a pro rata portion of the litigant's expenses, in-
cluding attorneys' fees, by allowing the litigant to recover his
expenses directly from the fund before any distribution.9" For
example, in the seminal case of Trustees v. Greenough,92 the plain-
tiff, who sued on behalf of other bondholders to prevent waste
and destruction of a fund, was held to be entitled to reimburse-
ment of attorneys' fees from the fund.
93
The three significant aspects of the common fund ex-
ception-ascertainability of the common benefit, ascertainability
of the benefitted class, and existence of an equitable cost-
spreading mechanism-form the basis of the more generalized
89 F.D. Rich Co. v. Industrial Lumber Co., 417 U.S. 116, 129 (1974) (dictum) (citing
Vaughan v. Atkinson, 369 U.S. 527 (1962)). This rationale may also be used to award
counsel fees for the willful violation of a court order, Toledo Scale Co. v. Computing
Scale Co., 261 U.S. 399, 426 (1923); and for fraud perpetrated upon the court, Univer-
sal Oil Products Co. v. Root Refining Co., 328 U.S. 575, 580 (1946) (dictum); and will-
ful and persistent default in performing a clear statutory duty, Vaughan v. Atkinson,
369 U.S. 527, 530-31 (1962). The rationale for the exception is punitive. Hall v. Cole,
412 U.S. 1, 5 (1973).
" E.g., Cato v. Parham, 293 F. Supp. 1375, 1378 (E.D. Ark.), aff'd, 403 F.2d 12
(8th Cir. 1968); Bell v. School Board, 321 F.2d 494, 498 (4th Cir. 1963); see Comment,
note 82 supra, at 660-61.
"' See, e.g., Sprague v. Ticonic National Bank, 307 U.S. 161 (1939); United States v.
Equitable Trust Co., 283 U.S. 738, 745 (1931); Harrison v. Perea, 168 U.S. 311, 325-26
(1897); Central R.R. & Banking Co. v. Pettus, 113 U.S. 116, 126 (1885). See generally
Dawson, Lawyers and Involuntay Clients: Attorney Fees from Funds, 87 HARV. L. REv. 1597
(1974).
92 105 U.S. 527 (1881).
93 Id. at 532-34.
" See Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 393-94 (1970). The substantial
common benefit exception may be thought of as an extention of the common fund
principle:
The traditional common fund over which the court exercises its jurisdiction
always represents a benefit capable of translation into money. Conceptually,
however, the fund is the aggregate benefit produced by the litigation, and the
court taxes any convenient resource jointly owned by the true beneficiaries.
Since the court's power to award legal fees is totally independent of the exis-
tence of a fund, it is not difficult to understand the judicial development from
the monetary common fund theory to the nonmonetary substantial benefit var-
iant. To award fees under the substantial benefit rule, the court must have
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substantial common benefit exception.9 4 The two leading Su-
preme Court cases using this exception elaborated upon these
three criteria. Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co. 95 was a shareholder
suit to set aside a merger procured by means of a misleading
proxy solicitation in violation of the Securities and Exchange Act
of 1934.96 In Hall v. Cole97 a former union member claimed that
he was expelled from the union because he exercised his free-
dom of speech guaranteed by the Labor-Management Reporting
and Disclosure Act.98 These cases established that (1) vindication
of congressional policy, as distinguished from vindication of a
concrete pecuniary interest, qualifies as an ascertainable benefit;
(2) the stockholders of a corporation or the members of a union
constitute ascertainable classes; and (3) taxing corporate or
union funds is an equitable means of spreading costs among
stockholders or union members respectively.99
Two Supreme Court decisions-Fleischmann Distilling Corp.
v. Maier Brewing Co. ""' and Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilder-
jurisdiction over some resource which is not at issue in the litigation but which
is common to all the beneficiaries.
Note, Awarding Attorney and Expert Witness Fees in Environmental Litigation, 58 CORNELL L.
REV. 1222, 1234 (1973) (footnote omitted). Consequently, some courts have awarded at-
torneys' fees under the common fund exception despite the absence of pecuniary be-
nefit. See, e.g., Kopet v. Esquire Realty Co., 523 F.2d 1005, 1008 (2d Cir. 1975). For the
sake of clarity, however, the substantial common benefit rationale is treated herein as
an independent exception instead of a variation of the common fund doctrine.
95 396 U.S. 375 (1970).
96 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1970).
97412 U.S. 1 (1973).
9' 29 U.S.C. § 41 l(a)(2) (1970).
99 Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 7 (1973); Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375
(1970). The Mills Court held that plaintiffs had succeeded in proving a violation of the
proxy rules, but that remand was necessary to determine whether the corporation or
the shareholders had suffered any actual injury warranting either equitable or mone-
tary relief. Nevertheless, even if ultimately no relief would be forthcoming, the Court
held that minority shareholders, "who have established a violation of the securities laws
by their corporation and its officials, should be reimbursed by the corporation or its
survivor for the costs of establishing the violation." Id. at 389-90. In contrast to the
pecuniary benefit to the corporation required by the common fund cases, "corporate
therapeutics" or vindication of statutory policy were deemed significant enough benefits
under the substantial benefit exception. Id. at 392-97. In Hall plaintiff sought rein-
statement in the union and damages. The case was brought under § 102 of the Labor-
Management Reporting and Disclosure Act. 29 U.S.C. § 412 (1970). Title I was enacted
specifically to protect union members' freedom of speech and assembly, 29 U.S.C.
§ 411(a)(2) (1970); however, it contained no provision for fee shifting. The Court noted
that no pecuniary injury had been shown due to the expulsion but vindication of the
statute's policy substantially benefitted the union membership and thus justified taxing
the union with plaintiff's attorneys' fees. 412 U.S. at 8.
Dictum indicating a substantial common benefit rationale appeared in early labor
cases involving members successfully suing their unions to enforce political rights. E.g.
Rolax v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. Co., 186 F.2d 473, 481 (4th Cir. 1951).
too 386 U.S. 714 (1967).
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ness Society'"l'-have placed significant limitations on equitable
fee shifting in the context of statutory causes of action.
Fleischmann raises the issue of statutory preemption of equitable
power to shift attorneys' fees. The suit was for trademark in-
fringement arising under the Lanham Act. 1 1 2 Prior to the
Lanham Act federal courts had unquestioned equitable power to
award counsel fees in trademark infringement cases "if deliber-
ate or willful infringement were established."'' 13 Section 35 of the
Act prescribes an intricate set of infringement remedies in the
nature of monetary relief, including a discretionary award of
treble damages in some instances. No mention is made in section
35 of the possibility of fee awards. The Court held that because
"Congress meticulously detailed [in section 35] the remedies
available to a plaintiff who proves that his valid trademark has
been infringed . . . Congress intended . . . [section] 35 . . . to
mark the boundaries of the power to award monetary relief in
cases arising under the Act."'' 1 4 Thus section 35's silence with
regard to fees was held to preclude equitable fee shifting.
Under the short-lived private attorney general exception,
judicial judgment that a public interest suit had vindicated an
important congressional policy was sufficient to warrant equita-
ble fee shifting.'1 5 In essence the private attorney general theory
raised the first criterion of the substantial benefit exception to
the level of an independent basis for equitable awards of counsel
fees.
1' 06
Alyeska involved a suit brought by environmental groups




The defendants were the Secretary of the Interior, the State of
Alaska, and the Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. Although congres-
101 421 U.S. 240 (1975).
102 15 U.S.C. § 1117 (1970).
103 386 U.S. at 715-16 & nn.4 & 5.
104 Id. at 719-21.
105 See Alyeska Pipeline Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 270 n.46 (1975) (col-
lecting cases); Comment, supra note 82, at 666-70.
106 Because of the association of the exception with public interest litigation other
elements were often present: a large beneficiary class-usually the public at large, in-
adequate governmental enforcement, and financial burden of private enforcement (aris-
ing in part because these suits were largely for injunctive relief as opposed to damages).
See, e.g., La Raza Unida v. Volpe, 57 F.R.D. 94 (N.D. Cal. 1972); Comment, supra note
82, at 666-70.107 The suit was brought on the ground that the proposed right-of-way and special
land use permits violated the statutory restrictions of the Mineral Lands and Mining
Act of 1920, § 28, 30 U.S.C. § 185 (1970), and the environmental impact statement
requirements of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-47
(1970). 421 U.S. at 242-43.
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sional legislation ultimately terminated the merits of the liti-
gation,1 8 upon subsequent application to the District of Colum-
bia Circuit, one half of plaintiffs' attorneys' fees were assessed
against the Alyeska Co.' 9 Authority to make the fee award was
found in the private attorney general exception""a because the
relevant statutes were silent on attorneys' fees"'1 and the tradi-
tional equitable exceptions were inapplicable.' 2 In particular,
the substantial common benefit exception was unavailable be-
cause, as re-emphasized by the Supreme Court in its reversal of
the award, 1 3 neither the criterion of ascertainability of the ben-
efitted class nor the criterion of proportionate fee spreading
among the beneficiaries of the suit was present. The Supreme
Court reasoned that to consider the general public of the United
1081421 U.S. at 244-45. Congress amended the width requirements of the Mineral
Lands and Mining Act to allow the necessary permits to be issued. Act of Nov. 16,
1973, Pub. L. No. 93-153, § 101, 87 Stat. 576 (amending Mineral Lands and Mining
Act of 1920, § 28, 30 U.S.C. § 185 (1970)). Congress also declared that construction of
the pipeline could begin without any further action under the National Environmental
Policy Act. Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act, Pub. L. No. 93-153, 87 Stat. 584
(codified at 43 U.S.C. § 1652(d) (Supp. 11 1973)).
109 Wilderness Soc'y v. Morton, 495 F.2d 1026, 1036 (D.C. Cir. 1974). Although the
Department of the Interior and the State of Alaska were defendants along with the
Alyeska Pipeline Service Co., only Alyeska was forced to bear the burden of the costs
incurred by the environmentalists. The court felt that 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (1970) barred
an assessment of fees against the United States, and that the circumstances of the case
would make it unfair to assess any of the fees against the State of Alaska. Id. at 1036 &
n.8. Because the fees could not be spread among all the defendants, the court deter-
mined that Alyeska should pay only one half of the plaintiffs' attorneys' fees and that
plaintiffs should absorb the other half. Id. at 1036.
11' "Acting as private attorneys general, not only have [plaintiffs] . . .ensured the
proper functioning of our system of government, but they have advanced and pro-
tected in a very concrete manner substantial public interests." Id. The court noted that
prevailing in the litigation was not a prerequisite to an award given the rationale for the
exception: "The advancement of important legislative policy justifying an award of at-
torneys' fees can be accomplished even where the plaintiff does not obtain the ultimate
relief sought by the filing and prosecution of his suit." Id. at 1034.
" 421 U.S. at 245. See Mineral Lands and Mining Act of 1920, § 28, 30 U.S.C.
§ 185 (1970); National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-47 (1970).
112 The court found the facts of the case did not justify an award under the bad
faith exception: "Appellees' legal position as to the meaning of the Mineral Leasing Act
and relevant administrative regulations, though ultimately rejected by the court, was
manifestly reasonable and assumed in good faith, particularly in view of the long ad-
ministrative practice supporting it." 495 F.2d at 1029 (citation omitted). The court did
not specifically refer to the common fund exception; rather, it confined itself to analyz-
ing the circumstances of the case in light of the broader "common benefit" theory. See
note 114 infra & accompanying text.
113 " '[Tihis litigation may well have provided substantial benefits to particular indi-
viduals and, indeed, to every citizen's interest in the proper functioning of our system
of government. But imposing attorneys' fees on Alyeska will not operate to spread the
costs of litigation proportionately among these beneficiaries.'" 421 U.S. at 245 n.14
(quoting Wilderness Soc'y v. Morton, 495 F.2d 1026, 1029 (1974)).
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States-ostensibly the beneficiary of the environmental suit-to
be an ascertainable class would "'stretch [the exception] . . .
totally outside its basic rationale.' 1114 Furthermore, a private de-
fendant is rarely in a position to distribute the costs of public
interest litigation equitably to the public.1 15 Justification for the
award, therefore, rested on judicial authority to shift fees solely
upon a determination that an important congressional policy
had been substantially advanced. Alyeska disavowed that a federal
court's equity power included such unfettered discretion in the
award of attorneys' fees and asserted that "legislative guidance
[is necessary] to consider some statutes important and others
unimportant and to allow attorneys' fees only in connection with
the former."' 6
Equitable fee shifting, therefore, is strictly limited by Alyeska
to cases falling within the traditional exceptions. Beyond these
exceptions, authority for fee shifting in any case must be pro-
vided expressly by Congress.'
1 7
2. Application of the Substantial Common Benefit Exception
As an alternative approach to statutory fee shifting under a
liberal interpretation of section 304(d), courts could justify a fee
award on facts similar to those in Georgetown as an exercise of
equitable fee shifting power under the traditional substantial
common benefit exception to the American rule."" The district
court found that plaintiffs' suit substantially benefitted the local
community of the District by publicizing the negligence of the
public officials in enforcing the Clean Air Act. Taxing the plain-
tiffs' attorneys' fees to municipal funds is arguably an equitable
means of spreading the expense of the litigation to its bene-
ficiaries-the citizens of the District. Thus, the three prerequis-
114 Id. at 245 (quoting Wilderness Soc'y v. Morton, 495 F.2d 1026, 1029 (1974)).
115 See id. at 264-67 n.39.
I rId. at 263-64.
117 In response to the Alyeska decision, Congress amended the Civil Rights Act of
1866 to give the federal courts the power to award attorneys' fees to prevailing parties
in suits brought to enforce civil rights acts. The Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act
of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-559, 90 Stat. 2641 (amending 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1970)). "The
purpose of this amendment is to remedy anomalous gaps in our civil rights laws created
by [Alyeska], and to achieve consistency in our civil rights laws." S. REP. No. 1011, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 6338, 6339 (footnote
omitted). This power is strictly limited to suits "arising under our civil rights laws, a
category of cases in which attorneys fees have been traditionally regarded as appro-
priate." Id. 4. "This bill creates no startling new remedy-it only meets the technical
requirements that the Supreme Court has laid down." Id. 6. Consequently, this legisla-
tion has no effect upon the judicial power to award attorneys' fees in environmental
litigation.
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ites to an award of fees under the exception-definite benefit,
discrete beneficiary class, and efficient fund-sharing mechan-
ism-are satisfied. Furthermore, such an award would be within
the limits placed on equitable fee shifting by the Supreme Court
decisions in Fleischmann and Alyeska.
Before proceeding to the issues raised by Fleischmann and
Alyeska, an initial inquiry should be made into the relevance of
plaintiffs' defeat on the merits to the judicial power to shift fees
under the substantial common benefit exception. The failure of
the district court to consider the applicability of the exception
undoubtedly stemmed from its view that the exception was only
available to award fees to a successful party.119 The district
court's view is supported by dicta in the Supreme Court opinions
Mills and Hall.12 " No persuasive reason exists, however, to con-
strue the rationale of the exception as limited to prevailing par-
ties. Georgetown is an excellent example of unsuccessful litigants
conferring significant benefits on a discrete class. The district
court specifically noted the enormous problems of proof faced
by the plaintiffs in Georgetown.12' Despite plaintiffs' understand-
able inability to overcome these barriers of proof, the court
nonetheless found that plaintiffs had rendered substantial ser-
vice to public awareness. 22 In effect the court may have been
suggesting that the success of a suit in a broad sense is not
necessarily limited to a favorable determination on the merits.
123
118 The obdurate behavior exception was inapplicable in Georgetoum because, al-
though they were alleged to be neglectful regulators, the District officials were not
charged with bad faith or unnecessary delay in the course of the litigation. Brief for
Appellee at 25; Brief for Appellant at 43. Arguably the District was obdurate because it
was dilatory in the implementation of indirect source review. Although awards have
been made for obdurate behavior where compliance with a statute has been delayed
unreasonably, these cases involved continued patterns of evasion anid outright refusal to
comply when the letter and spirit of the statute were clear. Awards in response to this
type behavior have usually been predicated on a pattern of evasion of civil rights stat-
utes over an extensive period of time. E.g., Bell v. School Bd., 321 F.2d 494, 500 (4th
Cir. 1963); Cato v. Parham, 293 F. Supp. 1375, 1378 (E.D. Ark.), aff'd, 403 F.2d 12
(8th Cir. 1968). See note 89 supra & accompanying text.
The common fund exception was inapposite to the Georgetown facts because plain-
tiffs neither established a new fund nor protected an existing one. See notes 91-93 supra
& accompanying text.
'"9 See 383 F. Supp. at 143-44.
120 See Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 5-9, 15 (1973); Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396
U.S. 375, 392, 395-97 (1970). The Mills Court, however, refused to decide whether
plaintiffs were entitled to an award of their attorneys fees on remand, see note 64 supra,
regardless of whether they were successful in proving actual injury or obtained "sig-
nificant relief." 396 U.S. at 390 n.13.
121 383 F. Supp. at 145.
122 Id.
12' The district court sought to justify its award as pursuant to section 304(d) au-
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Even assuming, however, that plaintiffs' defeat on the merits
barred application of the substantial common benefit exception
in Georgetown itself, courts may still wish to apply the doctrine in
future cases similar in all respects except for the outcome. Of
course, if plaintiffs are successful courts would also have author-
ity to tax fees to the private defendants under section 304(d).
The problem will be, however, that no award or only a partial
award of fees against the private defendants will be appropriate
if, as alleged in Georgetown, the public defendants are principally
responsible for the litigation by reason of regulatory ne-
glect. In prosecuting a successful action that ostensibly should
never have been necessary but for the laxity of local regulators,
plaintiffs will have conferred a benefit upon the local commu-
nity. Therefore, taxing the public defendants joined to the suit
under federal question jurisdiction will be appropriate. By as-
sumption, however, the liberal interpretation of section 304(d)
has been rejected as an alternative. Given this rejection, the
courts in future cases may wish to apply the substantial common
benefit exception to justify an award of fees to the successful
plaintiffs assessed against the public defendants.
Fleischmann held that an intricate statutory remedial scheme
may preempt what otherwise would be a legitimate judicial exer-
cise of equitable fee shifting power. The same issue is present
here in light of the express statutory provision in section 304(d)
for fee awards in suits arising under the Act if the party to be
assessed was joined pursuant to section 304(a). 24 The statutory
provision involved in Fleischmann, however, authorized recovery
of damages, trebled in some instances.1 25 Because such a remedy
thority and not under the common benefit exception. See text accompanying note 40
supra. Although the court recognized that section 304(d) awards could be made irre-
spective of the outcome of a suit, see id., it exercised a presumption against such awards
to unsuccessful parties. See 383 F. Supp. at 144-45. Thus, even in making its award
under purported statutory authority, the district court felt a need to address, if only
tangentially, the issue of plaintiffs' lack of success.
124 Relevant to this inquiry is section 304(a)'s limited scope reaching only polluters
with the single exception that one regulator, the Administrator of the EPA, is covered if
he has failed to perform a non-discretionary duty. 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-2(a)(2) (1970).
The Act also provides explicit remedies where local regulators fail to exercise their
duties: (1) if the local regulators never submit an implementation plan or the plan
submitted is inadequate, the Administrator is authorized to promulgate a plan for the
locality, 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(c) (1970); (2) if the local regulators fail to enforce the
requirements of an implementation plan, the Administrator is authorized to undertake
enforcement measures in their stead, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857c-8, 1857h-1 (1970). The stat-
utes involved in Mills and Hall, however, similarly establish complex federal regulatory
schemes, and those cases nonetheless found Fleischmann distinguishable and made fee
awards under the substantial common benefit exception.
"2 ' See note 104 supra & accompanying text.
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substitutes in practice for compensation to the litigant for his
counsel fees, the Fleischmann Court's determination that the ad-
ditional remedy of an equitable award of attorneys' fees is
preempted by the statute is not surprising. Damages are not
available, however, in citizen suits to enforce the Clean Air
Act.' 26 Fleisclmann is, therefore, distinguishable on this ground;
furthermore, in the subsequent Mills and Hall decisions, the
Supreme Court distinguished Fleischmann. In these later deci-
sions specific provision for counsel fee awards elsewhere in the
statutes involved was held not to preempt equitable awards of
fees under the general remedial provisions of the statute.1 27 Fi-
nally, Fleisclimann held that a "meticulously detailed" remedial
provision would preempt equitable fee shifting, 28 but the broad
direction in section 304(d) for award of fees "whenever the court
determines such award is appropriate" hardly meets that de-
scription.
Courts wishing to employ equitable fee shifting under the
substantial common benefit exception in cases presenting facts
similar to Georgetown will also have to distinguish Alyeska. Al-
though the narrow holding in Alyeska removed judicial equitable
fee shifting power only under the private attorney general
theory, given the similarity of analysis under that theory and the
common benefit rationale, 29 the courts are likely to require
careful delimitation of the latter approach. The critical issue is
whether the Georgetown case is analogous to the Mills and Hall
cases in which application of the substantial common benefit
exception was specifically approved in Alyeska130 or whether the
case is factually analogous to Alyeska itself.
Regarding the element of ascertainable benefit, the concern
in Alyeska was that courts should not have the discretion to select
statutory policies important enough to warrant counsel fee
awards; that choice was to be for Congress. Notwithstanding this
concern, the Court approved the awards in Mills and Hall even
though the statutory provisions concerned contained no express
authorization of fee shifting. Rather than view section 304(d) as
preemptive of fee awards without its scope-an objection already
'
2 6 See notes 24-25 supra & accompanying text.
' 27 See Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1973); Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396
U.S. 375, 390-91 (1970).
128 386 U.S. at 719.
129 Some commentators saw the private attorney general concept, at least under
certain conditions, as the substantial benefit exception carried to its furthest extension.
See King & Plater, The Right to Counsel Fees in Public Interest Environmental Litigation, 41
TENN. L. REV. 27, 61-62 & n.169 (1973); Comment, note 82 supra, at 667-68.
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addressed 31-the provision arguably indicates, if anything, con-
gressional approval of citizen suits that should be encouraged by
attorneys' fees awards under traditional equitable exceptions.
The elements of ascertainable beneficiary class and availabil-
ity of an equitable fund-sharing mechanism are interrelated and
will be treated together. The District of Columbia in Georgetown
and a state in a future case 132 arguably are ascertainable classes
in the same manner as corporations and unions. Similarly, taxa-
tion of fees to District or state funds, like taxation of corporate
or union funds, fairly spreads this expense to the members of
those classes. Alyeska, however, strongly intimates that the gen-
eral public of the United States, or any one state or the District
of Columbia for that matter, is too large and diffuse to constitute
an ascertainable class. 133 Two distinguishing points should be
made, however. The objection in Alyeska was directed more at
the inequitable spreading of cost to the general public if fees
were taxed to the private corporation, Alyeska Pipeline Service
Co. The extent to which a rise in prices charged by a private
corporation shifts costs proportionately to members of the gen-
eral public cannot be gauged with any accuracy, except perhaps
by "sophisticated economic analysis."'1 34 Taxing public funds, in
contrast, can effectuate fair distribution of costs to the public.
Secondly, in Alyeska, the United States was by statute specifically
immune to fee assessments. 3 The Alyeska Court, however, left
open the issue whether states' eleventh amendment immunity
barred an award of attorneys' fees against state funds.1 36 Persua-
sive argument has been made that it should not.' 37 Significantly,
13, 421 U.S. at 258.
131 See text accompanying notes 124-27 supra.
132 The Clean Air Act, in accordance with concepts of federalism, is structured as a
joint state-federal regulatory scheme. 42 U.S.C. § 1857 (1970). The District of Columbia
is a "state" for purposes of this scheme. 42 U.S.C. § 1857h(d) (1970).
133 421 U.S. at 264 n. 39.
134 Id.
135 421 U.S. at 246, 264 n.39, 265-68 & nn. 40-42. Award of attorneys fees against
the United States or any agency or official of the United States, unless specifically pro-
vided for by statute, is barred. 28 U.S.C. § 2412.
13 421 U.S. at 269 n.44.
137 No eleventh amendment problem is presented by fee awards under the express
provision of § 304(d) against state polluters joined under § 304(a) jurisdiction. Congress
expressly grants jurisdiction under this section over states "to the extent permitted by
the Eleventh Amendment." 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-2(a)(1)(ii) (1970). Congress may, pursuant
to its commerce power (and insofar as it is not limited by the tenth amendment), de-
prive a state of its eleventh amendment immunity to suit by one of its citizens if it does
so by "clear language." Employees of the Dep't of Pub. Health & Welfare v. Dep't of
Pub. Health & Welfare, 411 U.S. 279, 285 (1972). See generally Note, Attorneys' Fees an
the Eleventh Amendment, 88 HARV. L. REv. 1875, 1897-1901 (1975).
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the Court did not summarily dispose of the entire issue by hold-
ing that the residents of a state constitute too diffuse a class to
The eleventh amendment also presents no complete bar to the mere joining under
federal question jurisdiction of state officials qua regulators to an action arising under
section 304 brought by a state citizen where the action is for an injunctive remedy. See
Exparte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908); Note, supra at 1877-82.
The Supreme Court, wary of placing undue financial burdens on state treasuries
with the consequent impairment of state sovereignty, has held, however, that the
eleventh amendment limits the relief available in actions brought under the theory of
Ex Parte Young to prospective as opposed to retroactive injunctive relief. Edelman v.
Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974). See generally Note, supra at 1879-82. Awards of attorneys'
fees assessed against neglectful state regulators might therefore be prohibited under
Edelman as constituting retroactive relief. Convincing argument, alluded to in the text,
has been made for the proposition that awards of attorneys fees are valid under the
eleventh amendment where, as arguably was the case in Georgetown, such awards are
ancillary to lawsuits seeking only prospective injunctive relief. The courts of appeals
have split on this proposition. Compare Souza v. Travisono, 512 F.2d 1137 (1st Cir.
1975) (upholding an award of attorneys' fees in a successful action to require state
officials to permit access to legal advice for prisoners), vacated and remanded, 423 U.S.
809 (1975); Class v. Norton, 505 F.2d 123 (2d Cir. 1974) (upholding an award of coun-
sels' fees and costs against a state official in a successful suit to compel compliance with
federal welfare assistance regulations); Thonen v. Jenkins, 517 F.2d 3 (4th Cir. 1975)
(affirming an award of attorneys' fees against defendant state university officials due to
their obdurate behavior in a partially successful student civil rights suit); with Hallmark
Clinic v. North Carolina Dep't of Human Resources, 519 F.2d 1315 (4th Cir. 1975)
(affirming a denial of attorneys' fees as barred by the eleventh amendment in a success-
ful suit enjoining state regulation limiting right to abortion); Skehan v. Board of Trustees
of Bloomsburg State College, 501 F.2d 31 (3d Cir. 1974) (state college official im-
rune by reason of eleventh amendment from attorneys' fee assessment in suit for due
process violation in job termination), vacated on other grounds, 421 U.S. 983 (1975); Jor-
don v. Gilligan, 500 F.2d 701 (6th Cir. 1974) (vacating an award of attorneys' fees
against a state in a successful challenge to a reapportionment plan), cert. denied, 421 U.S.
991 (1975).
Joining state regulators under federal question jurisdiction to section 304 citizen
suits on the allegation that they have failed to fulfill duties imposed upon them by the
Clean Air Act raises the broad issue of the extent to which Congress acting pursuant to
any of its affirmative powers may require states to enforce federal law without impair-
ing state sovereignty preserved by the tenth amendment. See National League of Cities
v. Usery. 421 U.S. 833 (1976). A full development of this issue is beyond the scope of
this Comment. One court of appeals has suggested that negative injunctions upon the
states-for example, prohibiting the registration of vehicles not conforming with the
applicable federal standards under the Clean Air Act-are consistent with tenth
amendment state sovereignty, while affirmative injunctions upon the states-for exam-
ple, requiring establishment of retrofit programs involving evaluation and approval by
state officials of the devices to be used therein-impermissibly encroach on state
sovereignty. District of Columbia v. Train, 521 F.2d 971, 988-95 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert.
granted, 426 U.S. 904 (1976). Presumably, states would be required to institute any
necessary procedures ancillary to compliance with permissible negative injunctions.
Thus plaintiffs in Georgetown arguably were not barred by the tenth amendment from
seeking a negative injunction against the District regulators prohibiting them from issu-
ing construction permits to non-complying buildings, and an order requiring the reg-
ulators to institute pre-construction review as a necessary measure to compliance with
the negative injunction sought would likewise be constitutionally permissible. Other cir-
cuits have divided on the general issue of the extent to which Congress may, pursuant
to its commerce power, require states to enforce federal law. Compare Pennsylvania v.
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meet the ascertainable class prerequisite to attorneys' fees awards
under the substantial benefit exception.
13
Because Georgetown arguably fits within the three criteria of
the substantial common benefit exception as outlined in Mills
and Hall, the exception remains available to the courts for grant-
ing fee awards in future cases presenting strong justification.
39
IV. CONCLUSION
The demise of the private attorney general exception in
Alyeska was a setback to public interest environmental litigation
and put the onus on Congress to specify which statutes involve a
public policy important enough to warrant fee shifting. The
strict construction of the citizen suit provision by the District
of Columbia Circuit in Citizens Association of Georgetown v. Wash-
ington is a further setback, in effect requiring Congress to care-
fully delineate all the situations under a particular legislative
enactment that are appropriate for fee shifting. Such a construc-
tion burdens Congress with the formidable task of anticipating
all the appropriate situations for fee shifting before the legisla-
tion has even gone into effect. Moreover, this construction ig-
nores the practical reality that determining when fee shifting is
warranted is often a minor consideration in the enactment of
legislation as complex and controversial as the Clean Air
Amendments.
The result in Georgetown and the discouraging impact on
environmental interest suits could have been avoided. A liberal
interpretation of the express fee shifting provision of the citizen
suit section of the Clean Air Act could have constituted a statu-
tory basis for affirming the district court award of counsel fees to
EPA, 500 F.2d 246 (3d Cir. 1974) (federal government may constitutionally require a
state to implement a traffic control plan under Clean Air Act) with Brown v. EPA, 521
F.2d 827 (9th Cir. 1975) (Clean Air Act must be strictly interpreted to deny the Ad-
ministrator enforcement powers against the states in order to avoid constitutional is-
sues), cert. granted, 426 U.S. 904 (1976) and Maryland v. EPA, 530 F.2d 215 (4th Cir.
1975) (strict statutory interpretation denying Administrator power to direct state com-
pliance with federal pollution regulations because of doubtful constitutional validity),
cert. granted, 426 U.S. 904 (1976).
138 See 421 U.S. at 266 n.39.
139 The District of Columbia Circuit previously employed this doctrine in a
post-Alyeska case to prevent "the perceived injustice of permitting third parties to be-
nefit from the actions of another without sharing in the expenses incurred in securing
or guaranteeing the benefit." National Treasury Employees Union v. Nixon, 521 F.2d
317, 320, 321 (D.C. Cir. 1975): "Control over funds or assets is not a necessary condi-
tion for the application of this doctrine."
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plaintiffs. Alternatively, the award could have been justified as
legitimate equitable fee shifting within the substantial common
benefit exception to the American rule. Both Congress and the
courts must reevaluate the practical and legal realities of this
situation if they expect the private citizen to continue to play a
part in the enforcement of environmental statutes.
